Criminal Intelligence Career Development – Supporting the Case for Integration and Inclusion by Snell, Wayne
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Australian Security and Intelligence Conference Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events 
11-30-2010 
Criminal Intelligence Career Development – Supporting the Case 
for Integration and Inclusion 
Wayne Snell 
Australian National University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/asi 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Snell, W. (2010). Criminal Intelligence Career Development – Supporting the Case for Integration and 
Inclusion. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4225/75/579ffc34ac5bd 
DOI: 10.4225/75/579ffc34ac5bd 
3rd Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 30th 
November 2010 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/asi/8 
Proceedings of the 3rd Australian Security and Intelligence Conference 
 
73 | P a g e  
 
Criminal Intelligence Career Development – Supporting the Case for 
Integration and Inclusion 
 
Wayne Snell 
Australian Federal Police Fellow 
ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security 
Australian National University 
 
Adjunct Senior Lecturer 
Security Science 
Edith Cowan University 
 
Fellow 
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 
Macquarie University 
 
 
Abstract 
The implementation of a developmental continuum for intelligence professionals, based on a traditional competency 
model may be ubiquitous across the breadth of intelligence. This paper argues that specialised contextual and cultural 
education and training and subsequent recognition of those skills, knowledge and attributes, is an essential element in 
achieving organisational and individual objectives for criminal intelligence professionals.  The full integration of 
criminal intelligence operations into police and law enforcement decision making at the tactical, operational and 
strategic levels is an aspirational step in achieving a multidisciplinary operational environment.  The delineation of 
intelligence practitioners based on employment status, facilitated by the absence of specialised law enforcement 
training, is an impediment to organisational and individual efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
The key issues are explored through a case study of a number of state and federal law enforcement organisations within 
Australia and internationally.  A thematic analysis identified impediments to the full integration model.  Those 
impediments including a lack of a sense of community, lack of a sense of inclusiveness and belonging, incomplete 
operational and strategic alignment, deficiencies and inadequacies of skills across the full operational context and the 
inability to fully contribute and influence due to the reinforcement of bias and stereotype.  The issue of integration 
whilst maintaining specialist integrity is also explored. 
 
Keywords 
Criminal intelligence, education and training, policing, organisational development. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the quest for the professionalisation of the intelligence sector, we are bound to recognise that the sector is not a 
homogenous discipline, but a confederation of thematically directed communities.  Broadly, those sectors have been 
described as military, security, criminal and business (Ratcliffe, 2010).  This paper deals with criminal intelligence 
community and in particular police and law enforcement agencies with an internal criminal intelligence capability. 
 
Specifically this study relates to the integration and normalisation of intelligence professionals into policing and law 
enforcement organisations with a criminal intelligence capability.  A thematic analysis has been conducted on data 
collected from intelligence professionals, supervisors and managers, educators and trainers; and operations personnel 
employed within a number of law enforcement agencies within Australia.  This data was then thematically grouped with 
data from an organisational culture survey of an Australian law enforcement agency.  A qualitative meta analysis of 
factors identified in the data sets has produced the following observations.  This paper is specifically designed to assist 
policy makers in their deliberations regarding managing the risks and challenges in the policing and law enforcement 
sector.  This study has also drawn on research into the issues facing forensic science personnel employed within police 
and law enforcement agencies in Australia and abroad where the profile of the personnel employed is similar to the 
intelligence professionals identified in this research (Julian, 2009). 
 
If it is conceded that the ultimate goal of the intelligence professional is “the production of reliable information which 
decision makers hear, believe and act upon” (Kent, 1971) then any structural, organisational, policy or management 
element which detracts or inhibits from this goal should be very closely examined and alternatives investigated.  In this 
case the lack of a coordinated integration strategy which allows the intelligence profession to identify with the 
operational personnel and organisational unit is identified as a detractor and challenge to meeting this ‘ultimate goal’. 
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EXPLORATION 
 
There has been a shift in the profile of personnel engaged in criminal intelligence in police and law enforcement 
agencies in Australia in the past 15 - 20 years.  Generally the activities of collation, analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence were conducted by sworn or substantive operational members of the police or law enforcement agency as a 
role conducted on a posting.  That is the employee was posted to an intelligence (or similarly titled position with the 
same broad responsibility) for a period of time and then they would be transferred to another role perhaps in operations 
or a business support role.  What is characterised by this type of human resource strategy is the non dedicated 
intelligence agency model where the intelligence role could be considered ancillary to the main operational function.   
An overview of the historical environment includes:  
 
1. Training in this time has been described as inconsistent, relatively poorly distributed and not prioritised 
organisationally; 
2. The personnel where not generally tertiary educated and had little exposure to science based intelligence 
methods of analysis; 
3. The focus of the activity was generally tactical, designed to support the lower end of operations; 
4. The position of intelligence officer was anecdotally seen as a resting place for depleted, disillusioned and 
disabled personnel who were removed from the main operational functions; 
5. These positions did not generally work shift work and were not exposed to the rigours and risks of operations.   
 
As a result the reputation and standing of criminal intelligence personnel was generally not distinguished.  The efforts 
of the intelligence personnel were generally resisted by police and in particular detectives/investigators (Ratcliffe & 
Guidetti, no date). 
 
A significant change occurred within the past decade pre-empted by a number of factors including but not limited to: 
 
1. The political need to lever sworn police personnel back into frontline policing services;  
2. The need for the development of more sophisticated planning and management systems for the management of 
crime and crime response by police services;  
3. Rapidly increasing amounts of electronic and communications data;  
4. The move to a proactive/disruptive strategy, particularly in organised crime and; 
5. The development of a professional intelligence officer pool which presented an opportunity for police and law 
enforcement agencies to recruit this skill set directly from dedicated intelligence agencies and the military.   
 
As a result police and law enforcement agencies have developed roles, sections and even complete functions within 
their respective organisations dedicated to criminal intelligence.  In filling these new roles intelligence professionals of 
varying capability and experience have been recruited. 
 
As a discrete sector within law enforcement, intelligence personnel are sometimes described using terms such as 
operations support, close operational support, corporate support or crime support. (Australian Federal Police 2010, 
NSW Police Force 2010, Queensland Police, 2010).  This has facilitated a view which questions the ability of 
intelligence professionals to develop and operate with a sense of community.  Sarason (1974) described a sense of 
community as “the perception of similarity to others, acknowledged interdependence with others, a willingness to 
maintain this interdependence by giving to or doing for others what one expects from them and, and the feeling that one 
is part of a large dependable and stable structure.”  Elements which tend to reinforce the lack of a sense of community 
include: 
 
1. The delineation of sworn/non sworn roles; 
2. Differences in appearance, in particular uniform; 
3. A dichotomy of language and jargon; 
4. A different perception of value and reliability as a result of the black and white nature of the adversarial 
criminal justice system and the greyer, inferential environment of criminal intelligence. 
 
There is also a tendency to separate the criminal intelligence professionals from the investigators and patrol contingent 
of police/law enforcement services in terms of their physical location.  Whilst there may be some advantages to this 
type of deployment of the resources in terms of basic management practice, this type of management system also tends 
to deplete the sense of inclusiveness and belonging of the intelligence professionals.  As a result the level of efficacy 
and efficiency may be diminished as well as the well being of the intelligence professional.   
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The way in which intelligence professionals have been employed also presents challenges to the sense of inclusiveness 
and belonging of these employees.  The challenge stems from the recent strategy to ‘purchase’ expertise from outside 
the organisation and be brought in at salary levels above that of new employee investigators or police officers.  As a 
result the intelligence professional has not had the opportunity to build a strong network nor relationships as part of 
normal career progression.  Another challenge precipitated by this type of employment strategy is the perception that 
promotion and development opportunities are being denied to sworn or operations personnel.  That is because an 
intelligence professional may be recruited laterally into an agency at an elevated pay level/rank that those members who 
joined the agency at the recruit level are being denied the chance to progress.  This issue of course is easily explained 
with skill set, experience levels and qualifications comparisons – however the lingering discontent has been identified 
as an issue.  As a result movements of operations members who move into criminal intelligence roles and then move 
back out into the wider organisation can still harbour and more importantly communicate this type of sentiment. 
 
The investigative strategy of interdisciplinary teams where generalist investigators are teamed with specialist personnel 
such as forensic scientists, psychologists, financial investigators and intelligence personnel as well as others, has been 
identified as a successful model by a range of scholars.  (Wakefield & Brookman, 2009; Jones et al, 2005.)  The 
collocation of the intelligence professionals during the joint investigative team activity will also serve to ensure that the 
informal information and knowledge sharing is facilitated without the cumbersome and sometimes inhibitive formal 
processes.  This investigative strategy is designed to alleviate the incomplete operational and strategic alignment of 
criminal intelligence professionals.   
 
However it should be noted that there is a case for the separation of criminal intelligence professionals from the 
operational teams at the strategic level.  In much the same way that police and law enforcement agencies have 
developed a clear separation of their command ranks and operational ranks, there is an argument that the work of 
criminal intelligence professionals operating in the strategic environment should be separated.  Limited supporting 
information is available from the data sets however the general proposition is that there is limited interdependence of 
the work in the strategic environment.  This is an area worthy of further exploration. 
 
The issue of deficiencies and inadequacies of skills and knowledge across the full operational context is an issue which 
was clearly identified by the study participants.  Because the new intelligence professional is not offered specialised law 
enforcement or criminal justice training there is a lack of understanding of the role played and contribution which is 
actually made in the process.   
 
Specific issues raised have included; 
 
1. A lack of understanding of the difference between intelligence and evidence; 
2. The legal instrument and warrant system; 
3. The courts hierarchy in Australia and the legal process of criminal hearings; Authorities and powers in relation 
to information collection and demands; 
4. Court room etiquette and giving of evidence and; 
5. The elements of criminal offences.   
 
Clearly this places the intelligence professional at a disadvantage when attempting to undertake collation, analysis and 
dissemination activities.  This also creates difficulties with communications as there is an assumption regarding the 
knowledge of all the participants in an operational setting.  This disadvantage is reciprocal in terms of what contribution 
an intelligence professional may be able to provide.  Reciprocal informal education/training by a heutagogical process 
for the investigators could be facilitated if the criminal intelligence professional was fully integrated. 
 
There is a perception of an inability to fully contribute and influence due to the reinforcement of bias and stereotype.  
Because of the separation of the intelligence personnel from operations from the time of recruitment through training 
and into deployments the tendency is for the existing stereo types and biases to remain even though some very positive 
and productive interactions may occur.  These stereotypes and biases, particularly if they are perpetuated by managers 
and senior managers, become entrenched in the psyche of the operations personnel and as a result there is reduced 
opportunity to develop a full understanding of the capability of intelligence to drive operations and also for the full 
capability contained within data bases, analysis tools and individual expertise to be exploited.  Clearly, this is at odds 
with the current law enforcement strategy of being intelligence led. 
 
The issue of integration whilst maintaining specialist integrity (Davis, 2003) (aligned with professional ethics) is one of 
the key criticisms of bringing professionals ‘into’ law enforcement agencies.  The inherent risk of influencing the 
arguably objective process of intelligence processes by the strong political influences, internal culture of the operations 
personnel and the risks of group think/target focus which are identified within policing and law enforcement.  There is 
also the risk of being tasked by supervisors and managers with roles which are more aligned to operations rather than 
intelligence particularly in times of shrinking resources and critical time lines.  This problem can also be exasperated by 
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a lack of commitment or trust of the supervisor or manager to the integration process and also by a simple lack of 
knowledge of the capability and operational ‘horsepower’ of the intelligence professional. 
 
There is another challenge which presents itself with full integration and the maintenance of specialist integrity and that 
the opportunity for the intelligence analyst to seek ‘influence’ ahead of ‘credibility (Davis, 2003).  This challenge 
presents an ongoing risk that if either aspiration is lost then the value of the intelligence professional is significantly 
diminished and would reinforce some of the negative stereotypes and biases perpetuated against the intelligence 
function.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because criminal intelligence is at a crossroads (Ratcliffe, 2004), the integration of the intelligence professional will 
allow the operations staff and policy makers to have more direct exposure to the capability and value of the contribution 
and develop a better understanding of the utilisation of the products produced/better direction in the production of 
criminal intelligence products. 
 
The development of a specialised education and training programme which is facilitated either in house in a police or 
law enforcement agency or by the tertiary sector should become either a pre-requisite for employment (if provided to 
non sworn personnel by an external provider) or at least a mandatory programme to be completed as part of the 
respective induction programme into the Criminal Intelligence section.  This programme should include the basic 
elements of criminal justice in Australia with a significant emphasis on criminal investigative practice, criminal law and 
offences overview, briefs of evidence and statement development, rules of evidence, court room protocol and 
procedure, intelligence as evidence case studies in law enforcement.  
 
One model of providing this education and training internally is based in the modular training framework.  The 
intelligence professional/s could be included as part of a police recruit or new employee programme where they could 
participate in the relevant elements of law enforcement training as part of a school/class/squad.  This would assist with 
the inculcation of sense of team and esprit de corps identified as being unique to police recruits, facilitate also the 
opportunity for the identification and harnessing of the cultural aspects of law enforcement work and also providing the 
foundation for the development of a network of operational colleagues which is crucial for ensuring cooperation and 
assistance. 
 
Another consideration may be the appointment of intelligence professionals as special members/constables who are 
required to give a sworn undertaking to perform their duties in accordance with the organisational imperatives and in 
due diligence to the sovereign.  Whilst certain risks must be managed in undertaking such a policy such as clearly 
identifying the authorities, powers and boundaries of the exercise of any such authorities.  There is also the opportunity 
to clearly define the opportunities which may be presented, particularly in the collection area of intelligence.  This type 
of model is particularly popular in the United States where support functions as regularly ‘sworn in’ with restricted 
authorities and a restricted remit of operations, however they are clearly identifiable as being part of the greater 
operational resource.  (FBI, 2010; SAPD, 2010; TPD, 2010). 
 
Again this is a pathway to integrating the intelligence professional into the full operational context of the organisation, 
inculcating a sense of community which could be harnessed in actually operationalising the ‘intelligence led’ mantra.   
 
The adoption of this type of integration policy will also facilitate a sharing of responsibility by intelligence and 
investigations personnel for new initiatives to overcome pressing and common problems and also the preparedness to 
initiate new tools or techniques (Rijken, 2006).  This approach also allows the joint team decision making to be 
informed from the bottom up. 
 
The development of a strategic level model which not only lists ‘intelligence led’ as a key strategy but also a vision of 
what success in intelligence led activity would look like.  This will allow the development of operational and tactical 
implementation plans to be developed and illustrate the role and functions of the integrated intelligence professional.  
This type of policy development would then predicate an intelligence led structure which does not necessarily insinuate 
that the hierarchical command structure would be dominated by intelligence professionals in the literal sense, but where 
the key matters for consideration by that command structure should revolve around intelligence inputs and outputs. 
 
The continued separation of intelligence professionals perpetuates some of the risks and challenges which have been 
identified in various reports and scholarly articles (Behm, 2007).  Whilst this is not a new issue, this latest data brings 
together a number of the issues which have been independently identified.  The full integration of criminal intelligence 
professionals into the ‘main stream’ of policing and law enforcement agencies is a key outcome for agencies to meet 
their identified strategic objectives and in particular the strategy of being intelligence led.  Whilst this study identifies 
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some of the cultural difficulties associated with this type of policy shift it is argued that this is minor compared to some 
of the past challenges such as fully integrating women into policing, increasing education standards for recruits and 
reformation of the criminal investigative function. 
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